AUTHOR: Charlie Warren
ABSTRACT: By considering the new challenges to peace and security in the post-Cold War era, this article deals with the role that the U.N. Peacekeeping Operations are able to play. In particular, special attention is reserved for new practices of peacekeeping operations in light of the failures experienced in the early 1990s.
The end of the Cold War marked a normative and substantive change in peacekeeping operations around the world. In the 1990s, the new spirit of cooperation within the U.N. Security Council allowed it far more freedom of action in addressing and resolving international conflicts. According to the United Nations’ charter, the UNSC has “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” (article 24,1). The UNSC is required to adopt the necessary means when threats to or breaches of peace occur. However, there is no explicit mention in the charter of either peacekeeping operations or initiatives.
There are three types of peacekeeping operations. The first type is the ‘classic/traditional’ framework consisting exclusively of military intervention in which peacekeeping entails the deployment of a military force between two warring factions that had previously agreed to a cease-fire. Examples include the peacekeeping operation in the Golan Heights to divide Syrian and Israeli forces following the 1967 war—mission that is still ongoing and the U.N. Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan that has been in place in Kashmir since 1949.
The second type includes multidimensional tasks and usually involves failed states. It requires the U.N. to undertake other functions related to security and peace enforcement often contributing to reconstruction. Examples of this sort became more frequent in the 1990s when the ideological bias of the Cold War dissipated. Prior to the end of the Cold War, a controversial and in many respects failed example was the 1960-1964 peacekeeping operation in the Congo.
The last type of peacekeeping is the most ambitious one, occurring when the U.N. establishes a transitional administration in the context of a power vacuum. In this case the U.N. creates a wide-range, long-term peacebuilding plan that involves economic reconstruction, reconciliation, and institution-building. Timor Leste is the most recent example, although how successful the administration was there is open to debate.
Since 1948 the U.N. has undertaken 56 peacekeeping operations. A historical overview reveals the evolution of its approach through three identifiable phases and the current transition to a new one. The first phase lasted until 1988, comprising almost the entire time-frame of the Cold War. The United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a global confrontation in which every conflict was seen under the lens of the Cold War, which served to impede the UNSC from effectively addressing threats to peace. Thus, with the exception of the Congo operation in the early 1960s, the U.N. was exclusively involved in the first type of ‘classic/traditional’ peacekeeping operations, which did not require extensive cooperation between Moscow and Washington.
The second phase began in the late 1980s, just prior the collapse of the USSR. A cooperative spirit triggered the resolution of conflicts that had been prolonged for too long because of the dynamics of the Cold War (Angola and Cambodia, in particular). This phase was characterized by a significant expansion of U.N. tasks on the ground. Peacekeeping operations became multidimensional and included a range of activities from the U.N. being a mere intermediary through the deployment of interposition forces between warring factions.
Participation in the promotion and implementation of peace agreements entailed a wide range of peacebuilding activities including: electoral assistance, disarmament and demobilization of armed forces, assistance to civil society to prevent a resumption of fighting, and building up democratic institutions. By this time the role and responsibilities of U.N. peacekeepers’ had expanded to include conflict prevention, monitoring and peacebuilding activities.
However, new competencies generated new and more compelling challenges. The third phase, in fact, grew out of two shameful breakdowns of U.N. peacekeeping operations that were among the great tragedies of the late 20th century — the genocide in Rwanda and the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia.
The failure to prevent the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda in April 1994 and then to protect the Bosnian enclave of Srebrenica in July 1995 strained the credibility of U.N. peacekeeping at the global level. The U.N. came to realize that while capacity was a key determinant of success, political will was also a critical factor in the decision to intervene or not. In the cases in which the U.N. Security Council, and in particular the five permanent members, did not sustain full political support the peacekeeping operations were doomed to fail.
Learning the lessons from these failures, the U.N. Secretariat developed two guiding concepts it hoped would drive U.N. intervention in the future: the ‘duty to prevent’ and the ‘responsibility to protect.’ These new norms of intervention clearly contrast with some of the key-principles of the U.N. Charter, such as respect for sovereignty and the consent of warring parties.
In fact, the complexity of contemporary conflicts and the often short period of time allowed decision-makers – e.g. Rwanda – obliged the U.N. to overcome some of its leading principles as well. The ‘duty to prevent’ human catastrophes, like those of the 1990s, seemed to trump the inviolability of sovereignty enshrined in the charter.
In 2000, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan convened a high-level panel to explore recommendations, possible reforms, and policy implications of U.N. peacekeeping operations in the 21st century. The panel, led by Lakhdar Brahimi, delivered its final report that August. The “Brahimi Report” included recommendations on all aspects of peacekeeping, including politics, strategy and organizational and operational issues.
Taking the findings to heart, Sec. Annan advocated for the right for the organization to intervene to preserve peace and security even in cases in which ‘intervention’ clearly meant interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign country. Sec. Annan indicated in fall 1998 speech that lack of consent by a sovereign state would no longer block an intervention initiative – as it did in the past – but made it clear that no country had the right to intervene unilaterally. “The only institution,” he stated, “competent to assume that role is the Security Council of the United Nations.”
The issue of U.N. neutrality and impartiality was also put on the spot. There have been occasions where warring factions have exploited peacekeeping impartiality and therefore, under particular circumstances, the U.N. has been required to take one side. According to the Brahimi Report, the policy of appeasement that triggered the Bosnian failure would have to be rejected. Furthermore, especially in light of the August 2003 U.N. headquarters bombing in Baghdad, the U.N. determined it had the duty to defend itself from aggressors.
By the end of the Cold War the concept of security had transformed from a state-centered concept to a human-centered one. In the 1990s the emphasis was on human rights not sovereignty. As a result, the concept of security went from being ‘between states’ to being ‘within states’ with primary attention given to the human aspect of conflict both as a moral duty and in practical terms.
In this regard, the issue of refugees is indicative. In fact, masses of internally displaced people and refugees that cross borders to escape war represent not only the most tragic aspect of conflict, but also threaten the security of other countries and make further conflict more probable. The issue of human security is not only a moral one, but it is the core issue of contemporary conflicts.
The new doctrines and practices underlining the prevalence of human security over state security were adopted following the post-Cold War decrease of inter-state conflicts and the concomitant increase of intra-state conflicts. If the U.N. manages to persuade the international community that human security rather than national security should be the guiding principle it would represent a major departure from past and strengthen the collective character of peacekeeping.
Peacekeeping operations after the end of the Cold War also expanded at the practical and organizational level, including different stages of conflict management and resolution. As stated by Under Secretary-General of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guehenno during his November 2006 visit to SAIS Johns Hopkins University, the success of peacekeeping operations today – specifically Lebanon – depends on the degree to which they integrate three distinct aspects: First, the diplomatic and the political processes aimed at a permanent resolution of conflicts. Second, the military side of peacekeeping aimed at preventing the resumption of fighting and the demobilization of warring factions.- Third, the wide range of reconstruction efforts that are vital to the achievement of a lasting positive outcome.
The capacity of the U.N., Guehenno said, to guarantee and promote concrete progress in each of these aspects is at the core of success. The greatest challenge for future peacekeeping operations will be the ability of the U.N. to manage and solve complex conflicts. If the U.N. peacekeeping efforts successfully tackle these multidimensional tasks, the Security Council may be more likely to rely on the U.N. to guarantee peace and security globally.
SOURCES:
Ted Van Baarda and Fred Van Iersel, “The Uneasy Relationship between Conscience and Military Law: The Brahimi Report’s Unresolved Dilemma”, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 9, No. 3, Autumn 2002
James Dobbins (et al.), The UN’s Role in Nation-Building. From the Congo to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005)
Maria Kiani, “The Changing Dimensions of UN Peacekeeping”, Strategic Studies, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2004
David M. Malone and Karin Wermester, “Boom or Bust? The Changing Nature of UN Peacekeeping”, in A. Adebajo and C.L. Sriram (Eds.), Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21st Century (London: Frank Cass, 2001)
Eric P. Schwartz “UN Peacekeeping Reform: Seeking Greater Accountability and Integrity”, Council on Foreign Relations, May 18, 2005
James Traub, The Best Intentions. Kofi Annan and the UN in the Era of American World Power (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006)
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