By Charlie Warren
Speaking in Addis Ababa this past December, General William Ward, commander of the United States’ new African Command Center, revealed the mission of his whirlwind pre-holiday visit to the continent. “I am here to listen,” he said. “So that AFRICOM and our work is harmonized with the goals our partners and the regional economic communities have set for themselves.”
If they were listening closely development industry observers may have heard the ground beneath Africa shift. Act of aggression, bold mistake, or brilliant chess move, the U.S.’ military-led effort to improve African security via economic development and political stability has fast become a lightning rod. But while AFRICOM may become Trojan horse or beneficent godfather, it is certain to irrevocably alter the aid dynamic.
New Look, New Approach
Formerly under the jurisdiction of American command centers based in the Pacific, Middle East, and Europe, U.S. military operations in Africa will unite for the first time under AFRICOM. Dealing with Africa via a single unified command is meant to help the U.S. engage on the longer-term variables at the root of conflict, such as poor economic growth, inadequate health, and unstable governance. To that end, the base will include an unprecedented number of diplomats, aid experts and other civilians – all part of its mandate of increased cooperation between the Department of Defense, the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. Civilian staff positions will include foreign policy advisor, development and humanitarian assistance advisor, and a senior Treasury Department representative, as well as several key subject-matter experts.
Among the four senior executive service positions offered to non-defense officials is that of civilian co-deputy commander, recently awarded to career diplomat Mary Yates, former U.S. ambassador to Ghana and Burundi and most recently foreign policy advisor to EUCOM. She will direct AFRICOM’s civil-military programs and be responsible for policy development, resource management, and program assessment, as well as inter-agency coordination.
Ms. Yates acknowledged previous cooperative difficulties in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq but felt AFRICOM offered a clean slate. “We have a chance to build this structure from the ground up,” she said at a recent press conference in Africa. “We need to work together.”
Helping build that cooperative structure will be the Pentagon’s new Business Transformation Agency, which is advising AFRICOM on lessons learned from civil-military units in Iraq and Afghanistan. The group will help establish relationships and define roles and responsibilities in the inter-agency context.
Some analysts were less than sanguine about the cooperation. “We’re fairly dysfunctional as a country coordinating between the three primary agencies,” said Peter Roberts, managing partner at Flag International, a consulting firm with experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, where civil-military efforts were common. He said mission directors rarely collaborated and that communications between DoD, State, and USAID were generally poor.
Theresa Whalen, deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs, argued that difficulties arose when priorities crisscrossed. “It’s those crossroads where accidents occur,” she noted, “Those crossroads should have a traffic cop.”
Rocking the Development Boat
In early 2007 U.S. President George W. Bush backed AFRICOM by saying it would work to “promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa.” Aid agencies and non-profits argue that such work is compromised when linked to a military agenda.
“We’re worried that AFRICOM may put a military face on what should be a non-military goal: long-term development,” Paul O’Brien, director of aid effectiveness at Oxfam America, said in a recent interview. “Our fundamental belief is that U.S. development aid towards Africa should be civilian-led.”
John Stephenson, a senior consultant at Dalberg, a global development consultancy, saw the insertion of a major U.S. military command into relationships between African leaders, State, and USAID as potentially disruptive. “I’d imagine that even just trying to figure out how those relationships will work in the short term will create a disruption,” he said in an interview.
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Mr. Roberts predicted a lengthy process of adaptation. “Two years may be ambitious—I think it’s going to take five or ten,” he said. Calling USAID “out to lunch on AFRICOM,” Mr. Roberts said there had been no leadership from USAID and the State Dept. “I think they’re along for the ride.”
Moreover, U.S. military-led projects are unlikely to appeal to donors. “There’s deep distrust of DoD and its activities,” said Mr. Stephenson, who saw an ongoing industry push towards harmonization morphing into one of divergence. “To protect their own interests and to try and remain as neutral as possible, [donors] would see risks associated with deeper coordination with AFRICOM and DoD.”
Still, increased U.S.-China competition on the continent plus America’s commitment to AFRICOM will likely mean enhanced logistical support for USAID projects and additional funds for development.
The biggest problem is likely to be procurement. “There hasn’t really been any new thinking going into this,” said Mr. Roberts. Total contracts may increase, but due to little overlap between security and development contractors deals may favor defense contractors over USAID regulars. This could ratchet up both competition and animosity. Furthermore, procurement speeds are vastly different, with DoD moving quickly and AID taking months, even years to finally award a contract. Because there had been no shift towards cooperative procurement, “you’re probably not going to get the benefit of the strategic thinking,” he added.
Africa Pushes Back
The first thing General Ward heard on his listening tour was probably rejection. In the months before his trip several key African nations and coalitions reacted negatively to the base, expressing concern about the undermining of national sovereignties, an American move to secure natural resources, and possible interference in Muslim affairs.
First came South Africa, a major continental power, which last summer stated its opposition in no uncertain terms, backed by the 14-nation South African Development Community. Quick on its heels was the Nigerian government, which formally declared it would not welcome a U.S. military installation in Nigeria or West Africa. Shortly thereafter the West African-based Council of States and the Arab Maghreb Union (founded by Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Mauritania) stated their strong opposition to AFRICOM.
So the U.S. presses its face against the glass of African borders, still seeking a welcoming home for its new unified command. According to U.S. Congressman Donald Payne, the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa, the U.S. should have expected “a lot of skepticism because there has been so little attention given to Africa,” he said last September. “All of a sudden to have a special military command, I think the typical person would wonder why now and really what is the end game.”
The Defense Department has responded with a charm offensive, of which General Ward’s visit was only one part. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates also made a promotional visit to Africa late last year, just weeks after Deputy AFRICOM Commander Mary Yates had done the same with fellow deputy Rear Vice Admiral Robert Mueller.
Moreover, the Pentagon has floated the idea of a splintered command made up of several smaller postings scattered across the continent. All of which may be a sign of creeping desperation and uncertainty on the part of the U.S.
One thing is certain: Pentagon-led development funding is likely to increase suspicion among Africans.
“People will view the programs with even more skepticism,” said Mr. Stephenson, who foresaw a drop in local buy-in. “A lot of people are going to expect that it will affect the priorities of the development community and that it will swing more towards priorities of the U.S. government, as opposed to the priorities of the Africans themselves.”
General Ward addressed this hurdle while visiting Botswana. “Our intent is build mutual trust, respect, and confidence through a sustained relationship,” he said. “I want African leaders to see AFRICOM as a reliable and consistent partner in helping them achieve greater capacity.”
Still, it is not only Africans who remain doubtful. A recent analysis by the conservative Heritage Foundation said, “aside from describing a command that will focus less on war-fighting than conflict prevention and emphasize civil–military cooperation, the Administration has put forward only vague assurances that the U.S. military will not dictate policy to African governments.”
Hedging Into the Void with Hope and Fear
Another sticking point is whether the Defense Dept. will also dictate policy to other U.S. agencies, leading to a militarization of diplomacy and development. “Setting priorities within a country.” said Mr. Roberts WHERE?? IN AN INTERVIEW? A PRESS RELEASE? A STATEMENT? , “this is where the friction is really high.”
Commanding Officer General Ward addressed such fears in December AGAIN WHERE???: “Let me be very clear in stating that the U.S. Department of State will stay in the lead of our nation’s foreign policy,” he said. “AFRICOM will play a supportive role, and will do everything in our power not to disrupt or confuse current and ongoing U.S. government or partner nation efforts on the continent.”
Mr. Roberts was not convinced. “Follow the money,” he said, pointing out that DoD will spend $5 billion to establish AFRICOM. “It’s just the sheer volume of AFRICOM; whether they take ostensibly a leadership role, I think it will just change the equation in terms of how people interact.”
A recent collaborative effort in the Horn of Africa may offer some insight into the future success of AFRICOM. To catch Al Qaeda operatives fleeing the Persian Gulf region the U.S. military established the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa in 2002. After no great refugee flow appeared, a small, semi-permanent base of 1,500 military and civilian personnel was established in Djibouti with a mandate of local capacity-building. In the years that followed Camp Lemonier has managed numerous humanitarian and aid successes.
“CJTF-HOA has since become the essential model for AFRICOM,” wrote Thomas Barnett, a leading defense analyst and senior managing director of strategic consultancy Enterra Solutions. He believes that AFRICOM will represent a “franchising” of CJTF-HOA, incorporating its innovative three-dimensional approach of integrating defense, diplomacy, and development. Mr. Barnett believes Camp Lemonier offers an important lesson: “When left to its own devices and located away from the global glare created by U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military, in the form of CJTF-HOA, has sought to subordinate itself so deeply within the existing state department and U.S. Agency for International Development structures in east Africa.”.
A new Great Game is afoot in Africa. A century after Central Asia became a key battleground in the superpowers’ war for control of key territories and geopolitical resources, the battle has moved to the Dark Continent. China, Europe, and the U.S. jockey for leverage and natural resources. Recent bomb attacks by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb suggest extremist Islam is spreading from the Horn into North Africa and beyond. Conflicts sizzle and simmer in Sudan, Somalia, Congo, and now Kenya—countries that control billions in mineral and oil wealth.
The U.S. is betting on AFRICOM, a new command for a new age. But is the American military ready for these complicated and delicate maneuvers? Hard to say, but a December analysis in leading industry voice Jane’s Defense Weekly said AFRICOM’s mission was ill-defined and worried that “it may act as a destabilising, rather than stabilising, presence.”
The development industry can do little more than wait and follow its lead.
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