Zimbabwe - Which Way Forward?

Regime change by force

To begin, anyone intending to use this option whilst Mugabe enjoys absolute loyalty from all organs of the security forces (Army, Air Force, Police, Intelligence Services, a semi-paramilitary Prison Service, plus 10,000 and more irregular militia – the War Veterans movement that composes of actual veterans from Zimbabwe guerrilla war that won independence in 1980 plus thugs and youths too young to have even been alive then…) would be foolish to assume it will be a quick, clean operation. If Mugabe is assassinated in such a manner the services chiefs mentioned above would quickly realise that war crimes indictments for atrocities committed in places like Matabeleland in the 1980s would quickly follow and are therefore likely to launch armed resistance. Far more likely is that Mugabe would use the considerably well trained and well equipped forces at his disposal to retreat into the bush and launch a guerrilla campaign. It would be very convenient to call this the second chimurenga or liberation struggle (the first kicked out white rule)

In September 1998 an SADC task force was sent into Maseru, the capital of Botswana, following disputed elections in that country. Despite the obvious differences (for one, the Botswana Defence Force was not a diehard supporter of the government) the South African Defence Force, which led the intervention, found itself bogged down in fighting and riots that lasted for the best part of the next year. When, in May 1999, the SADC task force finally withdrew, the infrastructure of Maseru had been destroyed. In the south, key towns like Mafeteng had lost close to half their commercial real estate. Inflate this by several multiples and one begins to understand the stupid naivety of the violent regime change option for Zimbabwe.

South Africa has faced problems of wealth distribution and high expectations from the masses of poor blacks that hoped for economic salvation at the end of Apartheid. It is highly that South Africa is willing/can afford to pay for such a war, and if not South Africa, then who? Other Southern African countries? The UN (in other words the US), the UK, the African Union? The reasons why none of these would are clear. No one must doubt that Mugabe would be prepared to damage key strategic infrastructure in such a battle – so who pays for the rebuilding once the dust settles? What about the refugees and the inevitable civil unrest, crime and budget implications for Zimbabwe's neighbours of hosting yet more explanations? Recent events in South Africa vividly illustrate the likely ramifications of such a human exodus.

Besides, do the media really believe Southern African armies, with their history of solidarity in armed opposition to white rule, would invade one of the greatest moral and physical supporters of that struggle to install into power a government led by Tsvangirai and the MDC, a party they rightly or wrongly view as questionably close to Britain – the former colonial master? Does anyone really believe African countries are only now waking up to the fact that Mugabe is a monster? That they do not know that he has killed infinitely less people in the current wave of oppression than he did in the 1980s when the West was calling him a hero? The saying in the West about the news is 'Today's headline, tomorrow's trash paper'. Well, in Africa, today's experiences will be told across a million village fires by a million grandfathers to several million more grandchildren.

Non violent regime change

To suggest that cutting off power and trade embargoes for example, are enough to achieve this is just as naïve as it's more violent expression above. Who said that dictators cannot rule in darkness? The only result would be that the ruling elite (as in the case of Saddam's Iraq) become even richer by controlling a lucrative black market in fuel and basic necessities. Another exodus is surely likely to follow with inevitable consequences for Zimbabwe's neighbours. It is precisely because the MDC itself understands the arguments outlined above that it has been careful not to choose armed resistance, despite having elections rigged against its favour in the last three elections. It is also why it has rejected suggestions of sanctions or power cuts.

Why have the Africans been so lukewarm with Mugabe and why have they failed to gain a resolution?

A little mentioned fact is that the Southern Africans in particular have similar wealth and land redistribution issues to address. It is crucial to consider and learn from the land ownership issues in Namibia and the current debate over provisions in the Expropriations Bill proposed by Mbeki's government in South Africa's parliament, not to mention the furore over Black Empowerment policies. Put simply, criticising Mugabe's indigenisation policies on land or company ownership is inconsistent with reserving their own right to redistribute land and wealth away from whites in other parts of Southern Africa to blacks, by force if necessary. One may call seizing land from whites unfair; they would argue that whilst they would prefer less traumatic methods of redistribution, if it came to that they would do just that. Why? Because they believe it is consistent with the principles of natural justice that the children of blacks whose land was forcefully seized by whites have the power to forcefully repossess it from the children of those whites. Full stop.

Secondly, a sad but true reality is that Mugabe is right when he questions the moral authority of his neighbours to dictate to him on the tenets of democracy; neither President Kibaki of Kenya, Dos Santos of Angola, King Mswati III of Swaziland, Joseph Kabila of DR Congo, Sam Nujoma of Namibia, Museveni of Uganda, or Armando Guezibo of Mozambique can claim to run true democracies that guarantee rights of opposition. Mbeki and for that matter Tsvangirai himself (ask Arthur Mutambara, of the other MDC faction), have displayed dictatorial tendencies.

Given the security and economic and political realities discussed above, African countries have chosen to give Mugabe a way out. The script would have allowed him to leave with a sense of dignity and a feeling that he retired by choice and wasn't booted out. This path has failed for two key reasons. Firstly, Morgan Tsvangirai's bellicosity and open association with the West has hardened the determination of the powerful cadre of lieutenants in Mugabe's ruling clique to ensure he doesn't assume power. His open association and public feting of western governments, especially Britain, has made it impossible for the MDC to find supporters amongst the SADC leaders he has depended on to make Mugabe see sense.

Secondly, Thabo Mbeki's sensitivities about his own lack of frontline armed involvement in the liberation struggle means he starts with a weak hand; it explains why Mandela can do it, Desmond Tutu can do it, Jacob Zuma can do it, but Thabo Mbeki can't openly criticise Mugabe, whose contemporary in the struggle is Govan Mbeki, his (Thabo's) own father. If he does it, it will only be after every other credible African leader in the region has. In other words, on this particular issue, the history South Africa's current leadership robs it of the clout its economic position can be expected to offer in the region's geopolitics. Unlike Britain, Mbeki is also aware of the dangers of putting Mugabe's regime in a siege mentality. Mbeki's hand is also weakened by the amnesia and short-termism that infects Western foreign policy; the examples of Liberia's Charles Taylor in Nigeria, DR Congo's Jean Pierre Bemba in Belgium, Chad's Hussein Habre in Senegal means he cannot offer Mugabe the option of a dignified retirement in a third country.

Mugabe, for his part, is fully aware of the limitations faced by the SADC countries and has been prepared to play a long game over last few years of Mbeki's supposed mediation; leaving just enough of a window to allow the suggestion of cooperation with efforts to reconcile with the MDC without actually ever making any concessions. This way he has avoided stringent regional action whilst simultaneously weakening the MDC's fighting spirit. He has also ruthlessly exploited the MDC's ill advised closeness to the West and used the emotional, economic and political factors of liberation and redistribution discussed above to avoid stringent condemnation of his decimation of the economy by his peers.

Which way forward?

Mugabe and his circle are sure to realise however that they may just have overplayed their hand and are likely to regret calling elections in the first place, for in doing so they have tipped the balance against them to the point where matters have taken a global momentum. Mbeki cannot continue shielding them whilst the current ANC president and his likely successor as leader of South Africa, Jacob Zuma takes the opposite position. Matters are made worse for Mbeki by unions across Southern Africa; led by South Africa's COSATU, they are now talking of coordinated strikes across the region. Mandela's surgical comments in London will give confidence to other reluctant Africans. Zambia, current chair of the SADC is openly critical, as are Kenya (with the exception of the Presidency), Tanzania and Botswana. Farther out, Nigeria, Senegal and Ghana, respected operators in the African Union, are beginning to feel Mugabe is an embarrassment and a public relations nightmare for the efforts that have been made to clean up Africa's image as the last refuge for despots. This provides an opportunity to target and attempt to re-assure the structure maintaining the stability of Mugabe's regime. The heads of the Army, Air Force, Prison Service etc. are running a multimillion dollar industry that mushroomed when Zimbabwe invaded the DR Congo, ostensibly to support Laurent Kabila- - the current president's father, but effectively proceeded to loot systematically – mining, the works. They need some re-assurance that they will not lose this money or face investigations into there activities there. More importantly they need to be reassured that they will not be prosecuted for any crimes committed during Mugabe's rule. This cannot be empty promises and announcements, but via serious meetings with Morgan Tsvangirai himself. As galling as it sounds, it may be wise for the MDC to use its new parliamentary majority to pass a bill saying just that – immunity from prosecution for all former top ZANU-PF regime members. On the outside, the international community needs to ratchet up the pressure (discreetly, not by bombastic utterances to left wing liberal press like the Guardian….) that unless they find a way to leave power peacefully, they will never have a peaceful retirement and will be hounded, bound and thrown into a cold room in The Hague. This is a job for the MDC, the SADC, African Union, and in a far more discreet manner, the international community.

Mugabe will leave power. The question is how many people go down with him.